The Theory of the Correspondence in the Transcendent Theosophy

 

 Muhammad Muhammad Reza’i

 

   The relationship between the mind and the external world has always been one of the important issues attracting the attention of philosophers. In the Transcendent Theosophy (muta‘ąliyah), the quiddities (al-mąhiyyah) of external objects, are realized in the mind. In other words, the quiddities of objects in the mind and in the external world are the same. In this regard, Sabziwąrí argues that: “for each external object there is an identical existence in the mind”.

Therefore, according to the Transcendent Theosophy (alhikmah al-muta‘ąliyah), there is a complete correspondence between the mind and the external world. However, apparently, not sufficient proofs have been presented to demonstrate this theory. Most of the arguments regarding the issue of mental existence (wujud al-dhiní) are concerned with demonstrating the principle of mental existence rather than the correspondence between the mind and the external world and the compatibility of mental and external quiddities (al-mąhiyyah). Of course, there have been some discussions in this regard such as the discussion of the belief in the image (shabah); however, they are not sufficient to demonstrate the claim.

The aim of the present article is to yield the necessary proofs for the correspondence between mental and external quiddities on the basis of the Transcendent Theosophy. If a philosopher chooses to believe in the correspondence theory of truth after examining the existing theories concerning the issue of truth (sidq), ¾ ranging from the theory of correspondence and coherence to pragmatism ¾ he has to express the proofs for the theory of correspondence.

Rene Descartes (1595-1650), the French philosopher is one of the proponents of the theory of correspondence. He believes that we conceive the very existence of external objects, and to prove his claim, he resorts to God.[1]      

Yet, is there such a guarantee in the Transcendent Theosophy for the correspondence between the mind and the external world? It seems that the answer to this question is positive. According to the Transcendent Theosophy, beyond the theory of correspondence, there exists a particular cosmology that guarantees this conformity and whose principles are dispersed in different discussions. To the best knowledge of the writer, no one has ever approached the issue in this way.  The principles and preliminaries of this cosmology are as follows:

The First Principle: Each Contingent Being (mumkin al-wujud) is Composed of Existence (wujud) and Quiddity (al-mąhiyyah).

Mullą Sadrą believes that we derive two concepts from any contingent being: existence and quiddity. These two concepts differ from each other in terms of meaning and each refers to a different aspect; whereas, there is only one referent for existence in the external world. The union of quiddity and existence in the external world is similar to the union of the shadow and the real object (the owner of the shadow). In his al-Shawąhid al-rububiyyah he refers to this point.[2]  

He also believes that the contrast between existence (wujud) and quiddity (al-mąhiyyah) is not a contradiction in terms of reality and existence. It, however, means that the contingent being, due to its weaknesses and imperfections, possesses a meaning other than the meaning of the reality of existence. The contingent being is derived with respect to the contingency and imperfection of that very reality. Mullą Sadrą refers to this point in his al-Asfąr .[3]  

He is of the view that the union of existence and quiddity in the external world similar to the union of an individual and his shadow. The existence is existent in itself and quiddity can be realized by virtue of existence; that is, a shadow is meaningless without its owner (the real object). In other words, the owner of the shadow is the one who grants existence to the shadows.[4]

Hence, no quiddity can be abstracted from the Necessary Being Whose being lacks imperfection and weakness.”[5]

The quiddity of the Necessary Being is identical with His existence; that is, He doesn’t have any quiddity except for the particular and abstract existence which, unlike contingent beings, is free from any quiddity.

The Second principle: Principiality (asąlat) and Realization are for Existence rather than Quiddity.

Mullą Sadrą believes that existence is primarily and essentially realizable, and quiddity is existent due to existence. The question of the principality of existence (asąlat al-wujud) is based upon the following two preliminaries:

A. There are realities in the external world other than us that affect us. It means that if we accept this principle we have passed over the boundaries of sophistry.

B. We derive two concepts from each of these external realities: 1) their commonality in the origin of reality, and 2) their distinction in particulars. The first aspect is the aspect of their existence; whereas, the second one is the aspect of their distinction.  The common affair cannot be interpreted with reference to the particular or distinctive affair. We will name their common aspect as existence and their particular aspect as quiddity.

After these preliminary remarks, the question which may arise is: “Which of these concepts is the referent of external reality which is one?” In other words, which concept is principal and which is not principal and abstracted from the other? Mullą Sadrą believes that existence is principal; while, quiddity is derived from the reality of existence, since quiddity, as opposed to existence, is essentially far from being unreal. Thus, how could existence be mentally-posited (i‘tibąrí); while the realization of all objects depends upon it? 

He also compares existence with whiteness and argues that “to be white is more deserving to whiteness than to objects that are not white by essence and whiteness occurs to them”. In his al-Asfąr he discusses this point.[6]    

He also suggests in al-Shawąhid al-rububiyyah that among objects, existence is the most real object for realization since objects other than existence are realized in mind through existence in the outside world [7].

The Third Principle: Existence is a graded reality.

According to Mullą Sadrą, these external realities are the various stages of one single reality, that is, being is a unitary and graded reality, which possesses stages in which the distinguishing factor refers to the common factors. In other words, the distinguishing factor is identical to the common factors.

‘Alląmah Tabątabą’í  propounds the question of the gradation of being (tashkík al-wujud) in this way: “Existence is a reality that is multiple and at the same time one. It is one because; otherwise, the realities should have been distinct from the whole essence since existence is a simple reality and the concept of existence that is derived from these realities is the sharing of meaning (mushtarak-i ma‘nawí). In this way, the concept of existence as the sharing of meaning (mushtarak-i ma‘nawí) should necessarily be abstracted from the referents (distinguished in themselves) and this is impossible.[8]

Sabziwąrí states in Sharh  manzumah that Mullą Sadrą considers this judgment (that the single concept in itself does not derive from distinct realities in themselves) to be among the natural judgements.

That the reality of existence is graded is due to the fact that superior perfection originates from realities which themselves arise from the reality of existence. According to the principality of existence, there is no reality except existence to which such perfection could refer. Thus, being is a single reality that is essentially multiple and its distinct characteristics refer back to its common aspect. ^[9]      

The Fourth Principle: The Principle of the Commensurability of the Cause and Effect (sinkhíyyat), the principle of al-wąhid from one does not proceed but the one, and the Principle of the nobler possibility (imkan ashraf) God first created the world of the intellect (al-‘aql), then the world of images (mithąl), and last the world of nature. The inferior world is the manifestation of the superior world. These three worlds are also compatible with each other in the sense that any object that exists in the earthly world has an existence in the world of ideas and intellect. ‘Alląmah Tabątabą’í sets forth the discussion in the following way: 

“The universal worlds are classified into three groups that are vertically ordered based on their weaknesses and intensity, and there is a cause-effect relationship between them.  Intellectual beings are the direct effect of the Necessary Being as well as the intermediary cause for the world of ideas that is inferior to it. Furthermore, the world of ideas is the effect of the world of intellect and the cause of matter. On the other hand, intellectual existence has the highest rank of the contingent being, and the closest rank to the Necessary Being (wąjib al-wujud). Intellectual existence is peculiar to the individual. Thus, the existence of the intellectual world is the shadow of the Divine order which, includes all forms of beauty and perfection. The intellectual order of the world is the best and the most indisputable (solid, stable) possible (mumkin) order, while the ideal order is the shadow of the intellectual order and the material order is the shadow of the ideal order. Therefore, the general order of the world is the highest and most solid order.”[10]

In this regard, Mullą Sadrą states that: “There is no object in the world unless there is a soul for it in the other world and intellect in this world”. [11]

He also argues that:

“Thus, obviously, there is a spiritual (malakut) aspect for each object and a hidden aspect for any evidence. There is no object in this world unless there is a soul, intellect and divine name for it, (nothing exists in this world unless it praises Him in its glorification. Therefore, glorious and pure is the One Who owns the kingdom of everything and He is The One to whom you will come back”.[12]  

Mullą Hadí Sabziwarí states in this regard that:

“Each of these descriptive relations is the shadow of those luminous relations”.

“And an object that is gilded for adornment represents an instance of the light of its archetypes.”

“Not only like the amazing colors of the feathers of a peacock, but also like anything that is in the world of senses and evidence.”

The Fifth Principle: A Quiddity (al-mąhiyyah) Might Appear in Different Existences.

According to Mullą  Sadrą, a quiddity or a unique concept might have different existences or manifestations. Some of these existences are strong and some others are weak. Therefore, they may bring in their wake different acts, for example, the quiddity of a substance might probably be realized in an existence that is independent, immaterial, unchangeable and free from generation and corruption, such as the separate intellects (al-‘uqul al-mufąriq). On the other hand, the same quiddity may be realized in an existence that is dependent upon and accompanied by matter or is influenced by it, or is mobile or immobile and vulnerable to generation and corruption, such as the various kinds of archetypes. The same quiddity may also have a different mode of existence that is weaker than the other two. In this case, it is neither an agent nor a passive entity; neither mobile nor immobile such as the forms fancied by human beings. Mullą Sadrą poses the same issues in other place.[13]

The Sixth Principle: In Sadrą’s view, the Contemplation of Intelligible Essences is identical with the Apprehension of Universals.

Mullą Sadrą believes that the soul is regarded to be the source of the sensory and imaginary forms, that is, the emergence of these forms in the mind is external rather than immanent. 

However, concerning the intelligible forms, he believes that there exist some luminous and intellectual substances in the intellectual world. Any intelligible essence (that is also known as the Platonic Idea) governs a particular species as such, that is, in the world of the intellect and the intelligible (al-‘ąqil wa’l-ma‘qul), any species possesses an idea, which is pure, universal, immaterial, and unchangeable. While apprehending the universals, the soul contemplates that intelligible form. Although these forms are self-subsistent and individuated, the soul is not able to apprehend them as they really are due to its weakness of perception or the existence of some external barriers. Therefore, it apprehends them in correspondence with many (kathír).

An external barrier exists when, for example, a person with strong eyesight and a high power of perception is not capable of clearly distinguishing someone coming from a distance due to the dust in the air. Similarly, weakness of apprehension in one who suffers from weak eyesight results in not being able to clearly perceive a particular existent and generates features, which might be applicable to so many different individuals.

Therefore, although the soul is in a status to apprehend the intelligible world, it is incapable of its clear intellection as it is greatly occupied with material affairs. Of course, such a universality and ambiguity is sometimes due to the ontological scope of the known (mudrak)[14]. Consequently, the soul contemplates the intellectual and separate essence or Ideas during the apprehension of universal intelligibles. In other words, the intellect (al-‘aql), through the contemplation of particulars, is transferred from the world of sense to the world of intellect.

Considering these principles and preliminary remarks, it can be concluded that the rational soul, during the observation of the sensible existents that possess existence and quiddity will be ready to contemplate their intellectual quiddity in the world of intellect. On the other hand, the sensory existents are the degraded forms of the same intellectual existents, that is, their quiddity is one, whereas their modes of existence are different. Accordingly, while conceiving a sensible existent, we conceive its real quiddity. Thus, the quiddity of mental existence is the same as the external existence of the sensible existent and there is a complete correspondence between them. Consequently, based on the particular cosmology, it can be claimed that there is a perfect correspondence between mental quiddity and external quiddity.

The following diagram is useful in illustrating the issue:

                        GOD

 

      WORLD OF INTELLECT

 

           WORLD OF IDEAS

 

         WORLD OF NATURE                                          MAN

 

Notes: